Terror blasts exposed fatal flaws in security
Thu, October 02 2008
This time around, the central government, however, appears to have been struck by the close succession of serial blasts in Bangalore, Ahmedabad and the national capital; by the sheer intensity of criticism, both in the media and from the opposition; and probably, by the proximity of national elections, and appears to have finally been goaded to announce a number of capacity building measures, including the substantial augmentation of manpower allocations and resources to the Delhi Police and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), as well as the setting up of a ‘dedicated mechanism for research and analysis in areas of technology and counter-terrorism’ under the IB.
More significantly, the red herring of the Federal Investigative Agency appears to have been abandoned, with the prime minister observing, “Perhaps, there is no need to set up a new agency, and instead we ought to ensure better coordination and integration among the existing agencies for devising an effective counter-terrorism strategy.”
While the measures announced have been long overdue and are to be welcomed, it remains to be seen how quickly and completely they are implemented. Bureaucracies are creatures of long habit and have a tendency, after events have produced a momentary ripple, to lapse quickly back into settled ways of operation.
The political executive, on the other hand, tends to have the attention span of a gnat. Under the circumstances, continuous public and political pressure will have to be exerted to ensure that these decisions are quickly translated into action, and necessary resources are immediately made available.
Crucially, the capacity deficits are so great and so widespread that these initiatives, even if quickly, fully and efficiently implemented, would at best scratch no more than the surface. Far more will have to be done — particularly to bring the state police and intelligence apparatuses up to scratch. These are, in most cases, currently so degraded as to be of little or no utility in the context of counter-terrorism.
Worse, despite liberal central schemes underwriting security related expenditure, capacity building and police modernization, most states have failed to take significant advantage. Data on utilization of central funds for police modernization for the year 2006-07, for example, indicates an average utilization of just over 63.71 per cent for all states.
Recruitment to the police in many states has been frozen for years, and some states are currently functioning with deficits of up to 40 per cent against capacities often sanctioned over a decade ago. Where recruitment has occurred, the process has ordinarily been riddled with corruption, leadership posts have not been covered, and acute deficits in training capacities have undermined, and irrational deployments have diluted, any impact the increased manpower may have had.
In several states, recruitment of thousands of constables have subsequently been ‘cancelled’ by courts or other authorities because of pervasive corruption and irregularities that marred the processes.
It is useful, in this context, to reiterate the principle that you cannot counter terrorism in India’s cities if the countryside remains un-policed and ungoverned.
Securing the ‘hinterland’ and penetrating the dispersed networks established by terrorist organizations are necessary, if the urban and modern core of India is to be protected. Such comprehensive security cannot be achieved by the central government alone, and requires the state police and intelligence apparatus to be brought up to par.
Ajay Sahni edits the South Asia Intelligence Review and is an authority on sub-continental terrorism.
IANS
By Ajay Sahni
By Ajay Sahni
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